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Abstract 
 
This paper presents the results of an experiment into 
the relationship between the representation of data and 
decision-making. Three hundred participants online, 
were asked to choose between a series of financial 
investment opportunities using data presented in line 
charts. A single dependent variable of investment choice 
was examined over four levels of varying display 
conditions and randomised data. Three variations to 
line chart visualisations provided a controlled factor 
between subjects divided into three groups; ‘standard’ 
line charts, ‘tall’ line charts, and one dual-series line 
chart. The final results revealed a consistent main effect 
and two other interactions between certain display 
conditions and decision-making. The findings of this 
paper are significant to the study visualisation and to 
the field of visual analytics. This experiment was devised 
as part of a study into Analytical Behaviour, defined as 
decision-making facilitated by visual analytics – a new 
topic that encompasses existing research and real-
world applications.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In the last decade, Visual Analytics (VA) technology 
and techniques have been applied in areas of business 
intelligence, healthcare, insurance, fraud, finance, and 
journalism where issues of data overload  present a 
continued challenge [17]. VA is a multidisciplinary field 
intended to understand and support decision-making by 
understanding the reasoning and sensemaking processes 
that precede them. 
However, our own research has begun to identify a 
number of real-world applications applying VA 
techniques that directly facilitate decision-making in 
users – a topic overlooked by current research. Noted 
examples include; commercial web and mobile 
applications designed to support financial investment 
choices, analytics tools to optimise sell-through rates in 
online auction markets, travel apps that optimise choices 
to personal constraints, and healthcare apps designed to 
improve or develop new behaviours. Such examples of 
interactive visual interfaces being used to directly 
facilitate decision-making are abundant, both on the 
web and in major mobile app stores. Although VA 
research may have directly or indirectly informed the 
development of these examples, as a field VA has not 
formalised a research effort into decision-making as an 
area of study. 
An outgrowth of information and scientific 
visualization [27], VA was formalized by a research 
agenda motivating the need to improve situational 
awareness for national security, border control and 
disaster response in the US and globally [7]. A revised 
and shortened agenda was published the following year 
[26], highlighting the need for VA to support decision-
making but without ever proposing decision-making as 
a topic of study. Instead, the exploratory processes of 
analytical reasoning were made the primary focus, 
because they “directly support planning, assessment, 
and decision making”. This strategy has helped to 
advance the field of VA significantly and in it, our 
understanding of the reasoning processes that lead to 
decisions. Over the past decade however, the gap in the 
literature on decision-making has grown.  
The experiment presented in this paper is intended 
to form part of a larger body of research into a new topic 
of decision-making facilitated by VA, which we define 
under the term of analytical behaviour. Presently, the 
focus is on applications that capture decisions into the 
same system presenting data visualisations to the user; 
providing an observable closed-loop between data and 
decision-making. This explains our reasoning for 
isolating certain real-world apps, such as those support 
financial investment decisions– a scenario that inspired 
this experiment.  
As a topic, analytical behaviour provides a 
convenient context for previous work, including 
research by Savikhin et al. on the use VA to support 
economic decision-making [25], personal financial 
planning [23], and financial portfolio selection [24]. 
Their experiments provide evidence that exploratory 
VA techniques provide effective decision-support tools 
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for people with varying risk preferences. Furthermore, 
that visualised information “can be useful for 
overcoming bounded rationality issues that arise from 
the cognitive limitation of considering all the 
information at hand” [25].  
However, the precise relationship between the visual 
display of information and decision-making has not yet 
been examined in these or any other research to our 
knowledge. To begin to understand and explore the 
potential to model analytical behaviour, it is necessary 
to systematically study the components of VA that 
facilitate decision-making. For example, by conducting 
experiments that isolate the effect of variations in visual 
displays on decision-making by reducing or removing 
interaction variables, as is the case with the experiment 
presented in this paper. As the results from this 
experiment will show, variations in the ratio of line 
charts or using a dual-line chart over two separate line 
charts can have a significant effect on a user’s 
perception of risk and return. These results should 
encourage the need for further investigation into the 
study of analytical behaviour. 
 
1.1. Data representation 
 
The purpose of representing data is to provide an 
efficient and effective means for the end user to reach 
their goal. But the goal of the user may be to explore the 
data, as with intelligence analysis. Instead, it could be to 
efficiently perform perceptual tasks, the aim being to 
accurately decode visualised data to gain knowledge or 
insights. A person might from an infographic in the 
newspaper, or to make decisions directly from the data 
as a financial trader might do. 
 Data representation is the visual component that 
stands between the goal of the user and the raw data, 
regardless of whether the end product is a single chart, 
dashboard, report, or sophisticated analytics application. 
The purpose of visualisation is the efficient transmission 
of data from the screen to the mind of the user, therefore 
the effectiveness of a visualisation is dependent on 
maximising signal accuracy between the visual 
encoding of data and the user’s perceptual decoding and 
cognitive processing of that same information.  
The continuing rise in the scale of data makes the 
design and evaluation of VA tools uniquely challenging. 
Volume, variety, and velocity are attributes of ’big data’ 
[8,22] that make it impossible for a (human) data-
product designer to account for all possible future visual 
representations. For example, increasing the dots shown 
in a scatter plot reduces the accuracy of visual search 
tasks [13]. With this in mind, the effectiveness of a 
scatterplot may change over time given changes in the 
volume of data. Reviewing user requirements over time 
helps, but it would be preferable if this could be done 
automatically. Measuring the effectiveness of graphs for  
reasoning and perceptual-task processes is challenging 
because they relate to cognition and perception more 
than externalised decision-making. 
Two current solutions to the problem of 
unanticipated representation effects are to provide end-
users with customisable components, allowing the user 
swap out charts and create their own dashboards. This is 
problematic because it puts the user, a person less likely 
to understand how to optimise VA to support decision-
making, in the role of a VA designer. Researchers are 
exploring the potential for the computer to take this role 
on, using mixed-initiative systems to recommend 
visualisation techniques [12]. However, this is more the 
case for research into analytical reasoning and task-
based process, less so in VA decision-making research. 
 
1.2. Representation effects 
 
Cleveland and McGill aimed to establish a scientific 
foundation on visual decoding with the theory of 
graphical perception [6]. Their assertion being that 
when people extract information from graphs they are 
carrying out an elementary perceptual task. Their results 
led to the further ranking of perceptual accuracy by data 
types; continuous, ordinal, and nominal, by Mackinlay 
[20]. Perceptual tasks provide one perspective on the 
accuracy of representation, however, there are also 
cognitive perspectives that reveal representation effects. 
Researchers from distributed cognition found that 
different representations of data caused “dramatically 
different cognitive behaviours” [33]. The investigation 
into this “representation effect” was built on earlier 
psychology research that focused on the form, visual 
organisation, and sequence of “information displays” 
[18]. The study measured cognitive effort and accuracy 
within a cost-benefit framework; limiting its use to the 
evaluation of tasks but not applicable to the study of 
analytical behaviour. Zhang has suggested that graphs 
could be systematically studied without clarifying 
precisely how [31]. Aside from a theoretical framework 
to study problem solving using the attributes of external-
representations [32], we have found no suitable 
framework or theories to further this line of research into 
the study of analytical behaviour. A review of the 
economics literature into bias and framing effects did 
provide a more relevant view of decision-making 
grounded in psychology and is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
1.3. Bias and framing 
 
A number of cognitive biases have been explored in 
visual analytics, including; a framework that supports 
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the detection and mitigation of cognitive biases in visual 
analytics environments for criminal analysis [21]; 
identifying and minimising selection bias for high-
dimensional data exploration in visual analytics [11]; 
selection bias as a major opportunity and challenge in 
healthcare [10]; using mixed-initiative systems to 
’neutralise’ bias  [14]; and visual analytics techniques as 
“cognitive amplifiers, cognitive prostheses, and 
cognitive mediators” [1].  
The framing of a decision problem is controlled in 
part by the user’s role, but also by the formulation of the 
problem itself, collectively referred to as the “decision 
frame” [28]. For example, the statistics of a surgical 
procedure could be framed in two ways; a 90% survival 
rate or a 10% mortality rate. The impact of similar 
framing effect has been the subject of two experiments 
exploring the potential to ’nudge’ a person’s choice with 
alternate frames in the context of health behaviour 
change, and another looking at the influence of framing 
when evaluating mobile apps by their privacy ratings 
[4,5].  
Evidence of framing is otherwise well documented 
in the economics literature. It was identified thirty years 
ago that inconsequential differences in the formulation 
of risk problems produces marked effects [29]. 
However, economics research has, to our knowledge, 
never examined the effect of differences in visually 
encoded data. More recently it has been proposed that 
different decision frames could have moderating effects 
on loss aversion in the context of trading goods [2] and 
that there are three main types of framing effects [19]. 
However, framing effects are considered one type of 
cognitive bias and not a framework or model for 
studying behaviour. 
 
1.4. Prospect theory 
 
The modelling of decisions has long been the focus 
of economics research. Decades of experiments support 
widely impactful theories that explain the rational 
(meaning profit-maximising) and irrational behaviour 
of ‘economic man’. In classical economics, consumer 
behaviour was described in terms of utility; how 
consumers rank goods in terms of satisfaction.  
Expected utility theory was the normative model for 
rational choice and had dominated the study of decision-
making under uncertainty, prior to the introduction of 
Prospect Theory in 1979 by Kahneman and Tversky 
[16] in which they demonstrated several classes of 
problems that systematically violated the axioms of 
expected utility theory. 
Prospect Theory differs from Expected Utility as a 
descriptive model of behaviour that is more 
psychologically accurate. A key empirical insight being 
that people do, in fact, perceive outcomes relative to a 
reference point and not in terms of final states. In other 
words, the feeling of winning $100 is relative to a 
person’s current wealth and would be viewed differently 
by someone who, for instance, lost $100 moments 
before. The notion of reference dependence provided 
new insights into loss aversion and biases relevant to 
choices and judgements [3,16,30].  
In addition to the series of simple experiments 
showing violations of expected utility theory, 
Kahenman and Tversky’s original paper for prospect 
theory also presented a formal model of attitudes to risk. 
Their formulation, and its later revision as ‘cumulative 
prospect theory’ [30], elegantly accounts for the 
normative violations in a descriptive model that captures 
how people evaluate outcomes under risk in an 
experimental context. To apply prospect theory more 
broadly, researchers have sought to define more 
precisely both the reference point and the types of 
“gains” and “losses” a person is thinking about [3].  
The experiments that support Prospect theory reveal 
that, in general, people are more sensitive to losses than 
gains. This leads to risk-seeking behaviour when faced 
with the prospect of losses and more risk-aversion in the 
domain of gains. To reveal the asymmetry in behaviour, 
Kahneman and Tversky studied people’s responses to 
positive and negative prospects (meaning gambles). The 
reflection effect they found was named due to the 
reflection of preferences around zero. In other words, 
most people preferred a more certain gain of $3000 over 
an 80% chance of winning $4000, but also preferred to 
take the risk (an 80% of losing $4000 over a certain 
$3000 loss) when the prospect were mirrored. To our 
knowledge there have been no experiments to examine 
the same perceptions of value when risk and outcomes 
are presented in the form of data visualisations. Previous 
experiments have only studied the use of explicitly 
stated probabilities and outcomes in the form of words 
and numbers.  
Following the same approach as Kahneman and 
Tversky in their original paper, the experiments 
presented in this paper are a series of choice problems. 
We do not attempt to apply the prospect theory model 
as this stage. Instead, this paper aims to produce 
empirical evidence that the same findings from the 
original prospect theory experiments hold true when 
data is visualised to facilitate decision-making under 
uncertainty.  
To apply the formulas of prospect theory to visual 
analytics requires a single input value for a return 
outcome and its associated risk. Since risk is only 
perceptually implied in the variance of the line shown 
on a line graph, additional work is required to calculate 
these values that is outside the scope of this experiment. 
However, the formal application of prospect theory to 
visual analytics is within the remit of our larger research 
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programme into analytical behaviour. Results of this 
work are encouraging but not yet published. 
 
1.5. Online experiments 
 
The use of online experiments has proved to be a 
valid method of studying perceptual tasks with greater 
statistical power gained from a larger sample size, when 
compared to studies using a limited pool of students. 
Repeating Cleveland and McGill’s original study into 
perceptual task ranking, Heer and Bostock used 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to recruit a large number of 
participants, gaining greater statistical power than 
Cleveland and McGill as a result [15]. The trade-off in 
online experiments is the lack of control over external 
factors compared to lab studies. Our preference was to 
conduct this experiment online to gather evidence of 
analytical behaviour from people in their own 
environments. 
 
2. Method  
 
We conducted two experiments; a baseline 
experiment and a main experiment, using three hundred 
online participants. The main experiment immediately 
followed the baseline experiment in the same online 
session. Participants were recruited and managed using 
the service ProlificAcademic.ac, the experiment itself 
was conducted using the online service Qualtrics. With 
these tools, it was possible to recruit three hundred 
people, run the experiment, and remunerate participants 
in less than three days. 
 
2.1. Recruitment of participants 
 
We recruited three hundred participants using the 
online service Prolific Academic. A service similar to 
Amazon Mechanical Turk which has been used in other 
visual analytics studies on perceptual tasks [15]. A 
reward of £0.50 was offered to fit the estimated 
completion time of 5 minutes making the remuneration 
£6.00/hr. pro-rata. The average completion time 
following three hundred results was three minutes, the 
total cost of running the study was £165. The three 
hundred participants were assigned to one of three 
groups automatically by the Qualtrics software used to 
conduct the experiment. 
 
2.2. Baseline experiment 
 
In the baseline experiment, three hundred 
participants were shown the same three sets of 
prospects, one after the other. Each prospect consisted 
of two line charts showing two different stock prices 
over a thirty-day period. The charts were of equal 
design, different only in the data they displayed for the 
three baseline questions B1, B2, and B3.  
The first two baseline questions (B1, B2) are 
designed as perceptual tasks, meaning they have 
objectively correct answers. B1 asked users to identify 
the stock with the highest return, this requires a person 
to visually assess the return (change in value since day 
one) for each stock and compare them to be able to 
choose the stock with the largest return.  
B2 asked users to choose which stock had the 
highest risk. Participants were not told how to interpret 
risk, which is represented as the variance in price over 
time (i.e. the stock with the least straight line). Both 
questions, B1 and B2, are problems that have an 
objectively correct answer and are solved by performing 
elementary perceptual tasks. They were designed to 
identify a person’s ability to identify and rank simple 
risk and return values from line chart visualisations. 
The third question (B3) requires people to perform 
perceptual tasks to decode risk and return values, but 
unlike the previous two questions it requires an 
additional subjective judgement. B3 is designed to 
reveal a person’s appetite for risk under uncertainty, it 
does not have an objectively correct answer like B1 and 
B2. This reveals an analytical behaviour scenario where 
perception informs the answer, but does not provide it. 
This is also true of the four main experiment questions.  
 
2.3. Main experiment 
 
For the main experiment, three hundred online 
participants were divided into three groups (G1, G2, 
G3). The choices, contextual statements, and data were 
all identical for all three groups. The independent 
variable used was the method of visualisation; three 
Figure 1: Baseline question 1 tested the ability of 
users to perform perceptual tasks accurately. 
Participants were asked to identify the stock with the 
highest return over thirty days  
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factors were changed across groups. Group 1 were 
shown a default pair of line graphs – one for each stock 
price, Group 2 were shown a pair of taller line charts, 
meaning the aspect ratio was altered, and Group 3 were 
shown a single, taller line chart with two stocks 
presented on the same graph.  
In all groups, participants were required to choose 
the stock they preferred to invest in for the next 30 days, 
based on the performance of each stock over the 
previous 30 days. The same statement accompanied 
each pair of stocks and was presented the same to all 
participants, in all groups: 
 
The charts show the prices of two different stocks 
over the last 30 days. Choose the stock you would 
prefer to invest in for the next 30 days 
 
Participants were not assigned different roles; all 
users were ‘buyers’ and were not given any additional 
information or prompts about their current wealth or 
expectations. 
The same data is used for all three display 
conditions, generated by a simple ’random walk’ 
function in R. Parameters for variance, day one starting 
price, and day thirty closing price were used to adjust 
the patterns of randomised price data to suit each risk-
return choice problem presented to participants.  
 
2.4. Predictions and hypotheses 
 
The overall aim of this experiment was to study the 
effect of visualisation methods on decision-making. 
The following three hypotheses defined our 
expectations for the results of the experiment: 
 
H1: Most people will be risk-averse in the domain of 
gains 	
 
H2: Most people will be risk-seeking to avoid a loss 
(loss aversion) 	
 
H3: Choices will be consistent across groups 1 and 2 
(no representation effect), with some variation in 
choices made by group 3. 
 
Questions 1 and 2 in this experiment were designed 
to elicit similar responses to problems 11 and 12 from 
the prospect theory experiments conducted by 
Kahneman and Tversky in 1979 [16]. For instance, 
question 1 gives participants a choice between a ‘sure 
thing’ and a risky prospect in the domain of gains, 
while question 2 presents the same problem in the 
context of losses - a ‘sure loss’ versus a risky loss. In 
line with the findings of the prospect theory 
experiments, we anticipated people to be risk-averse 
when making choices in the domain of gains (H1) and 
risk seeking to avoid a loss (H2).  
For participants in group 3 (the dual line chart), we 
expected the majority of individuals to choose any stock 
that consistently dominates another stock simply due to 
it being easier to compare two lines that share the same 
y-axis. By extension, we expected that a risk prospect 
that dominates a ‘sure thing’ would be preferred more 
by participants in the dual-line chart group than in the 
other two groups who were shown separate line charts 
(H3). We expected participants in group 3 to exhibit the 
most, if any, difference in behaviour given that 
comparisons of risk and return are more efficient when 
two stocks are expressed on a dual-line chart. 
 
3. Results  
 
In the following section we analyse the results of the 
baseline questions (B1, B2, and B3) before reviewing 
the results of the main experiment. The results from B1 
and B2 enabled the creation of a subset of data 
containing the participants who were able to: a) 
correctly identify the stock with the highest return over 
30 days and; b) correctly identify the riskier of two 
stocks. In short, this sample set of users (N=237) are 
Table 1 Baseline Experiment Results  
(No Varying Display Conditions) 
Table 2 Main Experiment Results by Group, 
Question, Choice. Sample and All Participants 
Question Group Option A (%) Option B (%)
B1 1 90* 10
2 89* 11
3 90* 10
B2 1 5 95*
2 5 95*
3 7 93*
B3 1 75* 25
2 68* 32
3 74* 26
Sample (N = 257) All (N = 300)
Group Question A B A B
1 1 76* 10 85* 15
2 1 74* 12 82* 18
3 1 68* 17 77* 23
1 2 6 80* 8 92*
2 2 1 85* 3 97*
3 2 1 84* 2 98*
1 3 35 51* 37 63*
2 3 25 61* 30 70*
3 3 5 80* 8 92*
1 4 44* 42 50 50
2 4 39 47* 46 54*
3 4 27 58* 30 70*
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considered to be people who can correctly perform 
perceptual tasks and follow basic instructions. 
 
3.1. Baseline results 
 
Table 1 shows the proportion of participant choices 
for questions B1, B2, B3. These results reveal that the 
vast majority of the 300 participants chose stock A for 
B1, then stock B for B2. The table is divided by 
treatment groups to show that there was no significant 
variation between the groups before the visual factors 
were introduced in the main questions for experiment 2. 
As reported earlier, all three groups were shown the 
same visual representation of data for questions B1, B2, 
and B3. 
 
3.2. Main experiment results 
 
The results for both the sample (N = 257) with the 
total number of participants (N = 300) are given in Table 
2. The sample group are those users who correctly 
answered B1 and B2 in the baseline experiment. Figure 
2 shows the percentage of each treatment group that 
chose option “B” across all four questions. 
 
 
Figure 2 reveals a consistent main effect across 
graphical display types (i.e. all treatment groups; 
responses from G3 are consistently higher than G2 
which are in turn higher than G1. The difference 
between groups varies by question; the closest results 
are between G3 (98%) and G2 (97%) in Q2, there is a 
significant interaction between G3 (94.12%) and the 
other two groups; G1 (59.3%) and G2 (70.93%) in Q3.  
 
4. Analysis of results  
 
The majority of people made decisions in 
accordance with the experiments from prospect theory 
discussed in section 1.4. The results provide empirical 
evidence to support H1 (most people will be risk-averse 
in the domain of gains) in Q1, and H2 (most people will 
be risk-seeking to avoid a loss) in Q2. The main effect 
between groups points to two possible factors 
contributing to a representation effect in analytical 
behaviour:  
 
• The height-width ratio of a line-graph effects 
the shape of the line; ‘taller’ graphs accentuate 
changes in value, thereby altering a person’s 
perception of value 
 
• Two lines on the same graph enables more 
accurate comparisons of risk and return due to 
differences between line values are visually 
intuitive.  
 
The difference in choices made across groups does 
appear to depend on whether the choice is between two 
gains (Q1), two losses (Q2), higher performing riskier 
stock versus more certain but lower performing stock 
(Q3), and two stock with high but different patterns of 
risk. The two stocks in Q3 had the largest difference in 
value, leading to the y-axis of the charts in Q3 to be 
different ranges. A difference which is intuitively 
evident to the dual-line chart in group 3, where ~20% 
more people chose the riskier stock.  
The first two questions in the main experiment were 
based on experimental research problems from the 
economics literature. Table 3 shows the responses of 
users from Problems 11 and 12 from Kahneman and 
Tversky (discussed in section 1.4), compared to the Q1 
and Q2 sample results from our own experiment. In their 
experiment Kahneman and Tversky provided users with 
two choices for Problem 11; A: $1000, .50 or B: -$500, 
and two choices for Problem 12; A: -$1000, .50 or B: -
$500. In our experiment, the general premise of gains 
and losses was devised to be similar; choose between a 
sure and risky gain in Q1, then a sure and risky loss in 
Q2. Although it is possible to design line charts with 
Figure 2 The percentage of participants in the 
sample (N=257) choosing stock B in the main 
experiment. A main effect of display type on 
choice is revealed by the consistent group 
ranking for all four questions. The significant 
interaction measured for group 3 in Q3 is also 
visible. 
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specific return values, it is not possible to encode risk 
visually quite as simply as Kahneman and Tversky’s 
problems were able to do so using numbers.  
The results in Table 3 above show near identical 
findings to the original prospect theory experiments; the 
majority of users are risk averse when it comes to gains 
but risk-seeking when it comes to losses. However, 
although the majority of participants chose the risky 
choice over a sure loss in Kahneman and Tversky’s 
experiment (Problem 12) and our own (Q2), the number 
of users choosing the risky prospect is 28% greater in 
our results. By comparison, the results are only 1% 
different for Problem 11 and Q1. 
The evidence shows that analytical behaviour is 
consistent with the observations of risk and reference 
dependence from prospect theory. Furthermore, in the 
context of the original experiment, our results suggest 
that visualising uncertain values may lead to an increase 
risk-seeking behaviour compared to explicitly stating 
risk and associated return values.  
We applied the chi-square test of independence to 
determine an association between the two categorical 
variables; the visual display of information (G1,G2,G3) 
and stock choices (A or B) for four questions (Q1, Q2, 
Q3, Q4). The most significant interaction with the 
strongest effect was found for question 3 (X2 (2) = 28.4, 
p < .0001), with users of the dual-line chart (G3) more 
likely to choose stock B (80%) than those in other 
groups (61% in G2, 51% in G1). Cramer’s V (using 
SPSS) shows a close to moderate effect size of 0.332.  
The axis ranges for stock A and B are different in 
Q3, with stock B offering a greater return but also 
greater risk. Users in G1 and G2 may have assumed both 
axis were the same and not checked more carefully as a 
result; we suspected that more users would choose a 
risky stock that strictly dominates a low-risk stock. 
However, it is not possible to separate risk appetite from 
value perception in this instance. The time taken to 
answer individual questions was not recorded by the 
Qualtrics system, creating the possibility that the users 
who chose the low-risk/low-return stock had chosen 
more quickly than other users. It is also possible that a 
small number of people strictly prefer lower-risk 
investments to riskier alternatives regardless of how 
they are presented.  
A significant but less sizeable interaction was also 
found for question 4 (X2 (2) = 6.91, p < .05), with users 
of the dual-line chart (G3) more likely to choose stock 
B (58%) than those in other groups (47% in G2, 42% in 
G1). The effect size is reported as 0.16. In Q4 users had 
to choose between two risky stocks, though stock B 
features a large drop in price, followed by a rise. Stock 
B dominates stock A for the entire period in Q4, the 
same was also true for Q3. However, the results show 
that the same five participants that chose A in Q3 (the 
low-risk, dominated stock) also chose A in Q4. None of 
those participants chose A for all questions, reducing the 
potential that participants were inattentively answering. 
The fact that the same five users chose the stock with 
lower risk and return (compared to an alternative higher 
risk-higher return stock), supports the previously stated 
notion that a small number of users are far more 
conservative investors.  
A slightly less significant interaction was also found 
for question 2 (X2 (2) = 6.4, p < .05), with users of the 
dual-line chart (G3) equally likely to choose stock B 
(84%) as those in G2 (85%), though both are only 
slightly above G1, (80%). The effect size is reported as 
0.1578. Unlike with Q3 and Q4 the axis of A shares the 
same maximum value (£3k) with only £100 difference 
in the minimum values (stock A is the lowest at £2500). 
In at treatment groups the choice is the same; certain 
loss versus a loss which - due to it variance - has the 
potentially to rise slightly in price if only momentarily. 
Our results show that, in accordance with prospect 
theory, most people are risk-seeking in the domain of 
losses. Furthermore, that when shown on a single graph 
(G3), a riskier prospect that mostly dominates a certain 
loss is preferable to more people than those who see the 
same on two separate graphs.  
 
5. Discussion  
 
This paper presented the results of an experiment 
conducted online with three hundred participants. The 
objective was to study the effect of visualisation 
methods on decision-making. The results contribute 
new empirical evidence to that most people behave 
according to particular expectations of prospect theory, 
such as loss aversion. The data suggests that changes to 
the height-width ratio of line charts and the use of dual-
line chart when compared with two single-line charts, 
significantly alters the investment choices of some 
people. Specially, in the context of evaluating and 
Table 3 Comparison of results from Q1, Q2 to 
Prospect Theory problems 11, 12 
”Risky” Prospect ”Sure Thing”
PT (P.11) 16 84*
Q.1 15 85*
PT (P.12) 69* 31
Q.2 97* 3
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comparing the risk and return of two fictional stock 
market investments. This experiment represents an early 
insight into analytical behaviour by aligning the subject 
of decision-making in VA with economics.  
The majority of people in the experiment chose the 
more certain prospect in the domain of gains (Q1), but 
also chose the riskier prospect in the domain of losses 
(Q2). Our results support the expectations presented in 
the first two hypotheses, they are consistent with the 
principles of loss aversion. Furthermore, participants’ 
choices in Q1 and Q2 reflect the results from two 
experimental problems from the original paper on 
prospect theory. Therefore, consideration should be 
given in future research to the possibility that the formal 
models of prospect theory, though not applied here, 
could be explored for their use as descriptive, or even 
predictive models, of analytical behaviour.  
In the absence of a formal model, further 
experimental work would contribute to an improved 
understanding of risk perception. For instance, asking 
users to quantify the risk associated with stock 
investments. The experiment did not aim to examine or 
account for variations in risk appetite between 
participants, the baseline questions were devised only to 
reveal a person’s ability to identify and compare risk and 
return values. Sensitivity to risk, or lack thereof, may 
explain why some users do not follow the majority in 
their own choices. 
A fundamental question of analytical behaviour that 
has emerged from this study, is how - and why - a 
person’s perception of value differs from the true value 
in the data. Outside of a VA context, economics is just 
one of many other research areas that may offer insights 
into representation effect, bias, and framing effects. As 
our review of the economics literature has shown, even 
seemingly irrational behaviour can be systematic and 
predictable. 
Given the widespread use of visualisation across 
industries and the rise of ‘big data’, these results make 
for novel and significant findings. Future research is 
required to understand more about analytical behaviour 
in contexts other than finance, however, to which the 
current study is limited. However, this work is relevant 
to existing economics research into the use of VA tools 
to improve economic decision-making, mentioned in 
the introduction of this paper.  
On the subject of stimulus and response, the 
evidence of a ‘representation effect’ may also suggest a 
previously unidentified heuristic for judging risk from a 
line chart. We suspect that some form of attribute 
substitution is occurring ([see 9]), meaning that a person 
takes a ‘mental shortcut’ to simplify the complexity of 
risk presented in a graph. Our current hypothesis is that 
people extrapolate a limited amount of trend 
information from the chart, based on characteristics 
such as peaks, line orientation, or even the relative 
frequency of gains and losses. To put it another way, 
calculating an accurate risk value based from a line chart 
is impossible for most people, therefore we must assume 
that people apply a specific heuristic when evaluating 
and comparing risk with line charts. Based on this 
assumption, we theorise that an extrapolation heuristic 
could explain why changes to chart ratios influence 
decision-making. If taller charts magnify ‘peaks’ in the 
stock price data and people are using the size or 
frequency of peaks as the basis for a cognitive shortcut, 
their perception of value would be effected by having 
more and larger peaks appear. Further research is 
required to support the notion of an extrapolation 
heuristic.  
The interaction in Q3 and Q4 could be the result of 
individuals not paying close attention to the differences 
in the axis ranges for the two stocks. Although this is not 
a representation effect, it is another potential factor that 
affects decision-making that can be identified by the 
system automatically.  
The results of this experiment highlight the potential 
to improve some economic decision-making facilitated 
by data visualisation. This study is part of a larger body 
of work we are undertaking into analytical behaviour, 
identified as a new topic of decision-making in visual 
analytics. This experiment has identified new 
opportunities to combine economics with VA and other 
disciplines to examine a new and exciting topic within 
VA. Our own future research aims to apply the formal 
models of prospect theory to the study of analytical 
behaviour as a descriptive model of decision-making. 
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